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In the field of management, the study of governance has primarily dealt with decision-
making by Boards of Directors, Chief Executives, and senior managers. The corporate 
governance literature has generated important insights regarding incentive alignment, risk-
taking, and coordination challenges. Emerging trends, highlighted in this issue, raise new 
questions regarding managerial roles, organizational contexts, internal and social processes, and 
changes in governance over time. We encourage management scholars to rethink their approach 
to governance research by considering stakeholder engagement, the implications of big data, 
social impact, global dimensions, and comparative analysis of governance. A broadened 
conceptualization of governance may also deal with the dynamics of inter-organizational 
arrangements, including the co-creation of organizations of varying governance forms.   
WHAT IS GOVERNANCE? 
In this ‘thematic issue’, we assembled articles that reflect evolving practices in 
governance1. Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy 
                                                 
1 The articles in this thematic issue were accepted into the Journal under normal review processes and were not part 
of any Special Research Forum call.  Consistent with the 75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 
theme of ‘Opening Governance’ in 2015, we bring together exemplar papers to encourage new directions in 
governance research. We thank Anita McGahan for her substantial contribution to this editorial. We would also like 
to thank Don Robert, CEO Experian, for an interview with Scott Graffin and Oxford University's Centre for 
Corporate Reputation for arranging it.  
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themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board 
include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, 
supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. 
The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting 
(Cadbury Report, 1992). Corporate governance is therefore about what the board of a company 
does and how it sets the values of the company, but is distinct from the operational management 
of the company by full-time executives.  
These views of corporate governance stem predominantly from a financial perspective. 
For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) address corporate governance as “the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? 
How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad 
projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers?” These views stem primarily from an 
agency theoretical perspective that investigates the consequences of separation of ownership and 
control in the modern corporation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Recent corporate activity and 
views, however, have an expanded view of governance as involving stewardship and leadership, 
in addition to the narrower financial prudence role. From a survey of board members from 15 
countries, a leading executive search firm reports that strategic alignment and execution, engaged 
leadership, and capacity to adapt are hallmarks of a new, dynamic view of corporate governance 
(Heidrick & Struggles, 2014).  Given the emerging trend of more inclusive interpretation of 
governance, we refer to governance as leadership systems, managerial control protocols, 
property rights, decision rights, and other practices that give organizations their authority and 
mandates for action, consistent with McGahan’s (2014) call for the Annual Meeting theme.   
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Management research has dealt primarily with a well-defined set of questions on this 
agenda related to the governance of investor-owned corporations, including publicly traded 
companies, family-owned companies, and entrepreneurial organizations.  Scholarly studies tend 
to emphasize the mechanisms by which governance authority is executed in corporations. 
Important research on the separation of investor and managerial decision rights describes the 
challenges of aligning the interests of principals and agents under the constraints that arise from 
investor ownership.  Research on the roles of Boards of Directors and the authority of the CEO 
has led to extensive understanding of the context for managerial decision-making under 
uncertainty and risk.  Comparisons between entrepreneurial start-ups, mature firms, and family-
owned companies point to the pervasive need for governance mechanisms in the configuration 
and administration of a wide array of corporate activities. At the same time, different 
stakeholders, ranging from customers to policy makers, often question the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms.   
In this editorial, we provide a brief overview of governance research and point to open 
questions in this area. Yet despite the considerable opportunity for further research, the advances 
in this stream also shed light on the limits and challenges of dominant scholarly approaches to 
the topic of governance. Finally, we point to entirely new areas for scholarship based on a broad 
conceptualization of governance.  The field’s emphasis on mechanisms has left open important 
questions about the comparative performance of various approaches to governance, such as the 
relative strength for creating and capturing value of the publicly-traded versus the privately-held 
corporation.  As a consequence, we revisit core constructs of governance and reflect on their 
implications for management scholarship.  
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE RESEARCH 
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Corporate governance is one of the most widely researched topics by management 
academics and widely covered by business journalists as well. Studies in this domain examine 
corporate governance mechanisms that are implemented in an effort to align the interests of 
managers with those of owners. These studies typically focus on the dyadic relationship between 
a firm’s executives and the Board of Directors, executive pay, the effects of ownership 
concentration, and the market for corporate control with the intention of motivating managers to 
implement more efficient and effective uses of shareholder resources (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & 
Dalton, 2007).   
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, agency problems were identified as a primary 
cause of failure in the governance of a slate of large corporations.  The well-publicized corporate 
scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and others led to numerous governance reforms all around the 
globe. The combination of these scandals and corporate governance reforms brought increased 
attention and scrutiny regarding the oversight of managers of large public corporations. This 
increased oversight has taken many forms and has been a subject of several recent studies that 
point to opportunities for further research.   
First, there have been numerous legal reforms. Countries enacted new corporate 
governance codes to strengthen governance in light of the well-known scandals.  Examples of 
such reforms include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, the Cadbury Code in the 
United Kingdom, the Cromme Code in Germany, the Provisional Code of Corporate Governance 
for Securities Companies in China, and the Recomendações sobre Governança Corporativa in 
Brazil.  The conditions that led to these regulatory changes as well as the effects of the new 
regulations have been studied by Cowen and Marcel (2011), Shipilov, Greve, and Rowley 
(2010), Zhang and Wiersema (2009), and others.  
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Second, there has been increased media attention regarding the monitoring and 
compensation of CEOs during this time period.  While Khurana (2002) notes that in the decades 
leading up to the scandals of the early 2000’s media attention of CEOs was already on the rise, 
criticism of CEO compensation was fueled by these scandals. Annual lists of the best and worst 
CEOs as well as over- and  underpaid CEOs are grist for headline news and fuel subsequent 
media investigations into corporate practices (e.g., Bednar, 2012; Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 
2008; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012).  
Third, the collapse of the international financial markets in 2008 and the resulting 
worldwide recession prompted direct governmental interventions in many countries initially in 
financial services and subsequently in a broad range of sectors. Widespread bankruptcies led 
governments to supply banks and firms with substantial capital, thus raising questions about the 
robustness of governance rules in light of the ‘too big to fail’ narrative. Recipients of government 
funds, in turn, were often required to adapt their governance practices in one or more 
fundamental ways:  to dismiss and replace executives by processes outside of specified 
approaches; to make improvements in their mechanisms of decision-making; and to restructure 
their operations by mandate rather than by negotiation. While the direct involvement of some 
governments in corporate governance was temporary, several governments have kept and even 
increased their ownership in corporations and thus scrutiny of the managers of those 
corporations, leading to the emergence of state capitalism (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 
2013).  
Fourth, there is also increased scrutiny of managers by stakeholder groups that are not 
typically enfranchised directly in the execution of governance duties, such as employees, social 
activists, or other groups that may not have direct ownership of a given corporation.  For 
 6 
 
6 
instance, corporate fraud has been increasingly reported by employees through social media in 
and outside the workplace.  Social movement organizations formed by customers and other 
stakeholders also increasingly influence managerial decisions by calling for protests and boycotts 
against corporations. The increased scrutiny by social movement organizations has motivated 
managers to change their actions and modify their policies. Furthermore, social movements have 
led managers to shift their attention from profit to the ‘triple bottom line,’ which includes profit, 
people, and planet (e.g., Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, & Eilert, 2013; Kacperczyk, 2009; King, 
2008; McDonnell & King, 2013). 
THE COMPLEXITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 Recent corporate governance research has answered calls to go beyond the traditional 
agency conflict between shareholders and managers and the evaluations of managerial 
effectiveness from the investors’ perspective. Articles in this issue illustrate that researchers have 
started to explore governance problems at different levels of analysis by considering managers 
and their teams in leadership and other roles, rather than as agents of the shareholders or inside 
members of the Board of Directors.  They also present a variety of contexts in their studies that 
may alter the traditional conceptualizations of agency conflict. The different contexts include 
private and family firms, entrepreneurial businesses, non-governmental organizations, and public 
and private partnerships.  Governance researchers have also started to explore new processes by 
shifting their attention from incentive alignment to (internal) organizational architecture, 
coordination, and collaboration and to (external) social processes and policies.  Further, new 
studies increasingly focus on temporal effects of governance and explore governance shifts.  
Much more research on these topics is warranted. 
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 Carton, Murphy, and Clark (2014) in this issue illustrates the study of managers in their 
leadership role.  The authors sought to answer how leader rhetoric about employees’ ultimate 
purpose of work influences organizational performance. Using archival data on hospitals and 
data from an online experiment, they examined the importance of leader rhetoric and shared 
cognition in motivating employees to develop a shared sense of the ultimate purpose of their 
organizations. They found that leader expressions of visions and values increased organizational 
coordination and performance. Their results also revealed some interesting rhetorical patterns 
that leaders used even though they proved ineffective in communicating a shared purpose of their 
organizations to employees.   
 Scott, Garza, Conlon, and Kim (2014) investigated managers’ adherence to justice rules. 
In contrast to a wide range of studies on employee reactions to organizational justice, these 
authors examined the types of managerial motives that were associated with justice rule 
adherence. Using responses to a daily, experience-sampling survey, the authors found that 
managers adhere to distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal rules of justice for 
“hot” affective as well as for “cold” cognitive reasons. Further, their study revealed a complex 
relationship between justice dimensions and “hot” affective and “cold” cognitive managerial 
motives.   
Smith (2014), in her in-depth study of decision making in six top management teams, 
sought to find out how senior managers sustained commitments to strategic paradoxes, including 
exploiting their business units’ existing products while exploring their innovation. Using a 
dynamic decision model, she describes and interwoven relationship between dilemmas and 
paradoxes involving top management team decisions over their business units’ resources, 
organizational design, and product design. Her research also reveals that leaders adopt a shifting 
 8 
 
8 
decision making pattern in service of an overall strategy that embeds paradoxes and 
contradictions. 
Recent studies have also considered governance problems in different contexts, including 
types of firms. Patel and Cooper (2014), for example, investigated the interaction of different top 
management team members in the boardrooms of family firms. They found that greater structural 
power equality between family and non-family members of the top management team leads to 
higher firm performance. Although the presence of the founder CEO weakened the positive 
effect of structural power equality on performance in the study, the authors found stronger 
effects for family firms operating in dynamic environments and for firms with higher governance 
performance. 
In addition to different levels of analysis and contexts, new studies on corporate 
governance have begun to explore the roles of top managers and boards in different 
organizational processes, including internal governance policies and practices, as well as external 
processes, including social and regulatory changes and stakeholder preferences. Huy, Corley, 
and Kraatz (2014) examine the role middle managers play in influencing legitimacy judgments 
of the top management team as change agents within one firm after a radical environmental 
change involving the firm’s technological and competitive environments. They revealed how 
new top managers formulated a plan for change and enjoyed internal organizational support soon 
after their arrival to the firm. The authors also showed how middle managers looked for clues 
about the motivations, intentions, and capabilities of top executives by analyzing their plans and 
strategy implementation. As the firm’s top executive change agents failed in their efforts to 
provide effective responses to the environmental change, the authors of the study reported 
middle managers’ legitimacy judgments of top managers and resistance to organizational change.  
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In contrast to previous work that focused on the effects of different governance 
mechanisms on firm performance in isolation, Misangyi and Acharya (2014) examined the 
combinations of governance mechanisms that were used by firms in the S&P 1500. Their 
configurational examination provides evidence on how different governance mechanisms work 
together toward higher firm performance. The authors demonstrate, for example, that CEO 
incentives and monitoring mechanisms may work well together as complements, rather than as 
substitutes as theorized in previous literature. 
 Belogolovsky and Bamberger (2014) study the organizational implications of pay secrecy 
policy. Using signaling theory, they investigate the psychological mechanisms behind pay 
secrecy policies. The results of their multi-round laboratory simulation suggest that pay secrecy 
negatively influences individual task performance and participant continuation intentions.  
Moreover, the empirical support for their moderated-mediation model indicates that even weak 
signals that are associated with a managerial practice have important behavioral implications 
when the signals are interpreted in the context of other practice-based signals. 
A growing stream of studies examines corporate governance in relationship to external 
environmental processes, including changes in regulations, shifting stakeholder pressures, and 
emerging social policies. Rhee and Fiss (2014) investigate the mechanisms by which 
organizational leaders frame controversial practices. Their study on the framing of the adoption 
of ‘poison pills’ by US firms uses regulatory focus theory and the literature on source credibility.  
They found evidence that the stock market reacted positively to announcements of poison pill 
adoption when the framing of the adoption was aligned with the dominant institutional logic. 
However, negative stock market reaction was reported when statements signaled the speakers’ 
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self-serving interests. Their results also illustrated the importance of speaker visibility, prior firm 
performance, and practice prevalence. 
Gomulya and Boeker (2014) studied the managerial actions firms take after financial 
restatements or events that damage the firms’ reputation. They found that firms seek to send 
signals about their efforts and the credibility of their top executives to their stakeholders, 
including financial analysts, the stock market, and the mass media. Focusing on the attributes of 
the new CEOs, the authors found that firms with more significant restatements tended to name 
successor CEOs who served previously as CEOs, had turnaround experience, had training in 
accounting or finance, and graduated from elite schools.  
Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick (2014) extend the idea of corporate opportunity structure 
from the social movement literature to include the personal values of the corporate elite, 
particularly the CEO. In the context of the formation of LGBT employee activist groups, the 
authors study the political ideology of CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. They theorize that 
employee social activists consider CEOs’ values when deciding on their campaign against the 
company. In addition to evidence on how political liberalism of CEOs influence employee 
activism, the authors found support for the effects of contextual factors, such as CEO power, 
workplace conservatism, and the phase of social movement.   
Governance scholars can also make interesting contributions by understanding the 
temporal effects of governance and shifts in governance over time. In their study on CEO 
temporal focus, Nadkarni and Chen (2014) investigated the ways CEOs’ attention to the past, 
present, and future influenced the rate of new product introductions in different environments. 
They collected original data on CEO temporal focus from letters to shareholders, interviews, 
speeches, and press releases using a psycholinguistic approach (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 
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2001). Their results suggest that CEO temporal profiles are associated with different rates of new 
product introductions in stable and dynamic environments. 
Joseph, Ocasio, and McDonnell (2014) examined how the recent emergence of 
shareholder value logic in the United States led to a shift in governance over time. The 
governance shift in their study is the adoption of the CEO-only board structure or boards in 
which CEOs are the only insiders. Using structural elaboration theory, they show that the 
ambiguous nature of new institutional logics can benefit powerful CEOs. According to the 
authors, CEOs may even employ the new CEO-only board structure as a means to remove 
insider board members who have been rival candidates for the chief executive position.  
NEW AREAS OF INQUIRY 
What are some new opportunities for management scholarship if we broaden the study of 
corporate governance?  We encourage scholars to consider emergent, contextual trends that are 
reshaping of governance in organizations.  Broadening conceptions of governance raises new 
research avenues on the effectiveness and efficiency of non-governmental organizations, 
governmental bodies, proprietorships, and other forms in the creation of value through the 
deployment of organizational resources. Though far from exclusive, we highlight stakeholder 
engagement, the implications of big data, social impact, global dimensions, and comparative 
analysis of governance.  This last topic suggests revisiting questions about the unit of analysis of 
governance especially in light of contemporaneous creation of multiple, often project-based, 
organizations designed to work in tandem to accomplish specific goals, sometimes on a short 
timetable. 
The conferring of the Nobel Prize in Economics on Elinor Ostrom in 2012 coincided in 
time with a recent reinterpretation of stakeholder theory to emphasize such principles as 
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graduated sanctions and stakeholder legitimacy (Blair & Stout, 1999; Klein, Mahoney, 
McGahan, & Pitelis, 2012).  At the core of the argument is the insight that stakeholder claims on 
an organization’s governance rights, decisions, and processes are commensurate with the 
stakeholders’ investment in the activities of the organization.  Research is required to identify the 
boundaries of such claims, and the legitimacy of stakeholder interests in contexts where 
disagreements or ambiguity arise about the amount of collaborative investment and the terms 
under which it occurs (Klein et al., 2012).  Study is also warranted on the mechanisms of 
stakeholder engagement in decision-making and the constraints on action associated with 
stakeholder concerns. 
The phrase ‘big data’ refers to the large amounts of information generated from mobile 
telephones, Internet websites, and other devices tethered to computing.  Because much of the 
information associated with large-scale datasets is broad in scope, focused on transactions, 
frequently ill-structured, and often short in coverage duration, a challenge associated with the 
analysis of big data is in identification (George, Haas, & Pentland, 2014).  Patterns of behavior 
may be discerned, but inferring causal mechanisms from such data may be difficult.  Despite the 
challenges, big data carries significant promise for improving governance especially because it 
provides decision-makers such as corporate executives with opportunities associated with 
experimentation, structured feedback processes (e.g., ‘crowdsourcing’), and hypothesis-driven 
inquiry.  By transforming data into information for critical decision-makers, governance as a 
decision process may be significantly improved.  More research in the field of management is 
necessary to discern which processes are effective for supporting better decision-making. 
In terms of the social impact of corporate governance, management scholars should 
consider organizational purpose and the interests of different stakeholders beyond the 
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preferences of firm investors (Hollensbe et al., 2014).  As recent research suggests (see Bundy, 
Shropshire & Buchholtz [2013] for a recent discussion of this literature), the number of different 
parties attempting to influence how a firm operates has expanded in recent years.  The growing 
importance of multiple stakeholders suggests that researchers need to continue to expand the 
number of these groups considered in future research and also, potentially, revisit the theoretical 
assumptions that drive and define the types of research questions we examine. Consistent with 
this research, in a recent interview with Scott Graffin, Don Robert, the CEO of Experian, 
recognizes, “that the chief executive probably has one reputation with employees, another one 
with investors, another one with vendors, another one with clients, and yet another one with his 
own board.”  Accounting for how these multiple constituencies influence CEOs’ approaches to 
strategic decisions is an important endeavor for future research.   
The complexity associated with managing multiple stakeholders is amplified in light of 
the increased media scrutiny firms face (e.g., Bednar, 2012; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & 
Hambrick, 2008). Thus, the confluence of an increasing number of stakeholders and this 
increased media attention mean that, in the words of Don Roberts, how a firm is perceived by 
stakeholders is “a fragile and fleeting in dynamic thing that I think is in part a result of our 
financial performance, how we choose to communicate, what consumers think about us as a 
steward or guardian of their information, what third parties say about us in the media, blogs, for 
example, written communications and how our employees behave both on the field and off. It’s a 
lot of different things.” Juggling multiple and potentially conflicting expectations will be of 
central concerns for CEOs and represents fruitful ground for future research. 
 Another opportunity for researchers to broaden the study of corporate governance is to 
consider its global dimensions. While most previous research has focused on the U.S. system of 
 14 
 
14 
governance, there is substantial variation in corporate governance systems around the world. The 
variation is largely driven by institutional differences, including investor rights and protection 
(Fligstein & Choo, 2005). In addition to the legal origin of a country (e.g., common law or civil 
law), which can determine investor rights, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms maybe 
influenced by cultural values and norms, for example, the acceptance of inequality in the case of 
executive compensation. Owing to the differences in institutional systems around the world, 
families, financial institutions, business groups, or the state often own substantial shares in 
corporations and alter their corporate governance. Business groups (Keiretsus, Chaebols, Grupos, 
etc.), for instance, are dominant players in many countries. The interconnected relationship of 
their member firms acts as a powerful governance mechanism. 
 The global dimension of corporate governance also takes the operation of multinational 
enterprises into account. Whereas traditional governance research focused on the agency 
relationship between the multinational enterprise’s top management and its domestic owners, it 
is increasingly acknowledged that the activities and administration of these large corporations 
present a number of unique challenges for corporate governance. First, multinational enterprises 
operate in multiple countries, often with autonomous local subsidiaries and their managers. Such 
high level of organizational complexity undoubtedly makes monitoring and the use of 
managerial incentives problematic. Second, these enterprises are increasingly owned by diverse 
groups of shareholders as well as interact with local customers, government agencies, and other 
stakeholders. The pressures by these heterogeneous stakeholder groups likely lead to changes in 
the use and effectiveness of governance mechanisms. Third, multinational enterprises and their 
management may be powerful enough today to change institutions in different countries (e.g., 
pressure governments to change laws or shape the preferences and norms of their local 
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customers) and thus modify corporate governance systems of countries and/or establish the 
legitimacy of their own (foreign) governance systems. Taken these global trends together, it will 
be interesting to find out if corporate governance systems converge or diverge in different 
regions and around the world in the coming decades. 
 Increasingly, organizations work in such tight partnerships that their activities are 
virtually co-designed.  As the effects of governance decisions in one organization influence those 
of partnering firms, questions arise regarding the optimality of coordinated decision-making 
across organizational boundaries (e.g., Lavie, Haunschild, & Poonam, 2012).  How should such 
coordination occur in a governance system in which authority and responsibility are conferred 
only with reference to the focal organization?  What are the implications of coordination across 
organizational boundaries when such coordination creates conflicts for executives in the 
administration of duties?  What are the limits to inter-organizational coordination in the 
execution of the fundamental duties of governance?  Significant research is needed on how the 
various facets of governance are affected by inter-organizational arrangements.   
 The evolution of governance arrangements over time is centrally important to their 
continuing relevance and to the performance of organizations (Baum & McGahan, 2013).  
Constraints on organizational action arising from facets of governance designed to protect 
particular stakeholders may incite questions about the legitimacy of the arrangements.  
Organizations may close and redeploy their resources under alternative governance structures as 
a result.  In some instances, corporations may re-launch particular activities in different 
geographies and/or under an alternative charter.  Such alternatives may include corporations, 
non-profit organizations, or licensing arrangements. Under such circumstances, alternative 
governance arrangements compete to create value.  Comparative analysis of alternative 
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governance forms – and the implications of the decision-making, managerial, and organizational 
processes they imply – is another important area for future research.   
 In sum, these inter-related trends suggest expanded promise for governance research in 
the coming years.  This issue highlights a number of areas of new inquiry and we believe these 
studies will help broaden the scope of future work on governance.  As the conceptualization of 
what constitutes governance as well as the parties involved in overseeing the operations of 
organizations continue to evolve and expand, management scholars will have many opportunities 
to shape the dialog on what constitutes good governance and how organizations and society can 
be better served.  
Laszlo Tihanyi 
Texas A&M University 
 
Scott Graffin 
University of Georgia 
 
Gerard George 
Imperial College London 
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